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In the early 1960s, U.S. workers made nearly all the clothes sold in the U.S. They 
had wages, conditions, and collective power that labor unions and federal labor 
policies had dramatically – albeit insufficiently and unevenly – boosted since the 
turn of the twentieth century. But since the 1960s, U.S. consumers’ clothes have 
come to be made mostly by Global South workers (sometimes as migrants 
working in the U.S.) who are routinely paid far below a living wage. In many 
cases these workers also experience labor rights violations including delayed or 
denied wages and benefits; unhealthy and hazardous working conditions; and 
physical, sexual, and verbal abuse. The most fundamental rights violation, 
however, is disempowerment: Global South apparel workers’ rights to organize to 
defend their other rights are often obstructed by employers who block 
unionization efforts, who break existing unions, and who move production from 
unionized factories to nonunion factories. Global South governments, which often 
cannot or will not defend labor rights, commonly ignore or collude in these abuses 
(Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000; Dicken 2015; Ross 2004). 
 In the early 1990s, a transnational labor rights or “antisweatshop” 
movement emerged in the U.S. and other Global North countries to support 
Global South workers’ rights, focusing particularly on apparel production. Labor 
unions played a pivotal role initiating this movement to reform transnational 
capitalist production relations, frequently allied with or augmented by a non-
union consumer-based fraction of the movement in the U.S. and elsewhere (Anner 
2011; de Lagerie 2013; Esbenshade 2008; Garwood 2011; Wimberley 2009). 
Such Northern antisweatshop actors have provided valuable support to many 
Southern production workers and organizers who took the fundamental initiative 
and serious risks to stand up for their own rights. 
 U.S. college student antisweatshop activism was born in this context. It 
first emerged at Duke University in fall 1997, initiated by a student who had 
participated in the AFL-CIO’s recently-launched Union Summer internship 
program. Soon students at scores of campuses protested against administrations 
and corporations to thwart labor abuses at factories making “licensed collegiate 
products”: goods bearing schools’ trademarked symbols. Firms (“licensees”) 
contract with and pay royalties to college administrations for the right to organize 
these goods’ production and marketing. Many of these goods are apparel – 
usually made in the Global South – which has been the primary focus of the 
student sector of the U.S. antisweatshop movement (Featherstone and United 
Students Against Sweatshops 2002; Katz forthcoming; Van Dyke, Dixon and 
Carlon 2007). These student activists have often changed target actors’ behaviors, 
sometimes promoting significantly better conditions for production workers.  
 Our purpose in this article is to explicate the student sector’s systemic 
advantages, vis-à-vis other consumer-based parts of the U.S. antisweatshop 
movement, that have facilitated its activity and effectiveness in struggles over 
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collegiate-licensed apparel. We offer new arguments to show how college 
campuses contain mobilization advantages for antisweatshop efforts, how 
collegiate apparel production is structured, how college administrations play 
pivotal roles in the power relations governing those global structures, how college 
students possess potential to exercise power over administrations, and how all 
these conditions in combination create systemic opportunities for antisweatshop 
action that are spatially commensurate with the power relations these student 
groups seek to change. To accomplish these goals, we examine micro-, meso-, 
and macrolevel processes and actors and the connections among them. We sketch 
a picture of the single overall network that links Global South apparel workers, 
U.S. college student activists and administrations, and companies producing and 
marketing collegiate licensed apparel. That picture’s purpose is to show how this 
network constitutes a single system of movement dynamics and power relations 
that enables student activists to impact apparel manufacturers’ and marketers’ 
behavior and thereby support apparel workers’ struggles for their own rights. 
 Although U.S. student antisweatshop activists have fought other battles, 
including violations of campus workers’ and low-paid U.S. workers’ rights 
(Garwood 2011), much of their effort remains focused on the grievance out of 
which the movement’s student segment was born: violations of apparel workers’ 
rights in the Global South, particularly workers making apparel for the collegiate 
licensed market or making other apparel for brands that participate in that market. 
An extraordinarily grim recent example of such labor rights violations is the April 
2013 collapse of the Rana Plaza apparel factory building in Bangladesh, which 
killed at least 1,129 people and received extensive international news coverage. 
The previous year, several hundred workers died in Bangladeshi apparel factory 
fires. These events were not truly “accidents.” Under cost pressure by the Global 
North brands for whom they contract, Bangladeshi apparel manufacturers skimp 
on building safety, as well as paying particularly low wages and routinely 
suppressing unions (International Trade Union Confederation 2014; North 2013). 
 Apparel workers in other countries generally face less deadly, less visible 
abuses than those suffered by well over one thousand Bangladeshi apparel 
workers crushed and burned to death in recent years. Yet, serious violations of 
apparel workers’ rights pervade much of the Global South. In the Dominican 
Republic the Korean-owned BJ&B cap factory, which made collegiate-licensed 
caps for many schools, exemplified such violations. In 1998 the U.S. garment 
workers’ union UNITE, responding to a Dominican union federation’s request, 
documented BJ&B’s wages of about 70 U.S. cents per hour (fairly typical for 
Dominican apparel workers) and multiple kinds of labor rights violations, 
including firing workers injured on the job. One BJ&B employee stated that 
“when you get in trouble, [managers] will grab your face and smack you on the 
head.” UNITE reported that “workers were sexually abused as well – managers 
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often groped women with impunity. Workers also suffered verbal humiliation, 
with Korean managers yelling graphic racial and sexual insults at the employees” 
(Ross 2004:275). 
 Rana Plaza and BJ&B represent apparel workers’ rights violations in 
many other factories and countries. This is the central grievance of the U.S. 
antisweatshop movement’s student sector. What have these student activists done 
about it, and to what effect? 
STUDENT ANTISWEATSHOP ACTIVISM:  
HOW ACTIVE? HOW EFFECTIVE? 
The U.S. student antisweatshop sector has been persistently active – i.e., 
mobilized – in that grassroots student activists have organized on many campuses, 
pressed administrations and corporations to act to promote workers’ rights, 
created and maintained national organizations to pursue their goals, and met with 
apparel workers who were already fighting for their own rights in the Global 
South. Beginning in 1997 campus antisweatshop groups set off “an explosion of 
student protest activity” at many U.S. colleges, including occupation of 
administrative offices (Van Dyke, Dixon and Carlon 2007:193); they soon 
pressured many college administrations to impose labor codes of conduct on 
collegiate product licensees (Featherstone and United Students Against 
Sweatshops 2002; Garwood 2011). Student antisweatshop groups emerged in 
colleges across the U.S., including large doctorate-granting public universities 
(e.g., University of California-Los Angeles, Ohio State, Virginia Tech), smaller 
public schools (e.g., Central Connecticut State University, Lewis-Clark State 
College in Idaho, Truman State University in Missouri), Ivy League universities 
(e.g., Harvard, Brown), small private liberal arts colleges (e.g., Swarthmore, 
Morehouse), and other private schools (e.g., Tulane, Northwestern) (United 
Students Against Sweatshops 2000-2010).  
This 1999 sit-in was characteristic of early U.S. student antisweatshop 
activity: 
 
University of Michigan students sat outside the school president's office, 
demanding a meeting to discuss working conditions at factories that 
make university-licensed apparel. Members of Students Organizing for 
Labor and Economic Equality say they want to make sure the factories 
aren't operating under sweatshop conditions.... Students planned to 
spend the night in the building and resume their protest today. The 
protest follows similar demonstrations at other campuses across the 
country.... A key student demand is that manufacturers reveal the 
locations of the factories that make licensed apparel to check on pay, 
safety and workers' ages. (Associated Press 1999) 
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Student antisweatshop activists continue tackling new problems, as in this more 
recent example: 
 
The Dallas Cowboys have a new merchandising arm that recently 
jumped into the business of producing college-logo apparel for leading 
universities, but the Cowboys subsidiary has already encountered a 
stubborn opponent – student groups that contend it is using overseas 
sweatshops.... At the University of Southern California, students [in the 
Student Coalition Against Labor Exploitation] returning to campus this 
fall are voicing outrage that their school signed an ambitious 10-year 
licensing deal with the Cowboys last May while keeping the 
negotiations secret from the students. (Greenhouse 2011) 
 
 These student activists created national organizations. First, to facilitate 
coordination, in 1998 student antisweatshop groups created the national umbrella 
group United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), which had approximately 
150 campus chapters and several paid staff members in early 2015 (Featherstone 
and United Students Against Sweatshops 2002; Garwood 2011; United Students 
Against Sweatshops 2015).  
 Second, the campus chapters and USAS concluded that they needed an 
ongoing, well-resourced organization to help translate codes of conduct into 
reality in collegiate-licensed product factories. While some corporations, colleges, 
and non-student nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had ostensibly formed 
the Fair Labor Association (FLA) monitoring organization for this purpose in 
1999, USAS and campus antisweatshop groups rejected the FLA because of its 
corporate influence. In 2000 USAS and its campus affiliates campaigned to 
establish the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), which would have no corporate 
representation and whose priority would be to respond to production workers’ 
complaints. They pressed college administrations to join it and leave the FLA, but 
administrations at many colleges initially refused or equivocated. Student activists 
then applied pressure. For example, students did sit-ins at Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Arizona, New York-Albany, Oregon, Iowa, Kentucky, Tulane, and Macalester; 
there was an 11-day hunger strike at Purdue and a two-day fast as well as a sit-in 
at the University of Pennsylvania; and “twelve Syracuse students biked across 
campus 100 percent garment-free” (Featherstone and United Students Against 
Sweatshops 2002:20). At some schools administrators had police use tear gas and 
arrest dozens. But ultimately 44 schools pledged to join the WRC by the time of 
its official creation in April 2000. By 2015 the WRC included 180 colleges and 
had a long record of documenting labor conditions and brokering solutions 
(Esbenshade 2008; Garwood 2011; Worker Rights Consortium 2015). The 
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WRC’s endurance despite the corporate-backed FLA’s competition “evidence[s] 
the power of student protests” (Garwood 2011:69). 
 In addition to organizing themselves and engaging opponents, student 
antisweatshop activists have frequently made face-to-face contact with Global 
South apparel workers. As part of its support for BJ&B workers in the Dominican 
Republic, the UNITE union brought two BJ&B workers, Kenia Rodriquez and 
Roselio Reyes, on a speaking tour to several U.S. college campuses in 1998, 
giving students direct encounters with workers who made caps that bore their own 
schools’ logos and helping to spur early campus antisweatshop mobilization. 
Subsequent tours that visited student activists on multiple campuses included 
workers and often union organizers. Among these tours were those from 
Mexmode, Mexico (2001, 2006); TOS Dominicana, Dominican Republic (2008); 
Jerzees de Honduras (2009); Alta Gracia, Dominican Republic (multiple tours 
beginning in 2011); PT Kizone, Indonesia (2013); and Rana Plaza, Bangladesh 
(2014 and 2015) (authors' direct observations 2008-2015; Brown Student Labor 
Alliance 2013; Evans 2006; Garwood 2011; Ross 2004). 
 Student activists also went to apparel workers’ home countries to meet 
them. USAS has organized summer internships; in 2005, for example, USAS 
interns were in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Swaziland, Kenya, Turkey, India, 
China, and Cambodia (United Students Against Sweatshops 2005). Groups of 
USAS activists visited Kukdong/Mexmode workers in Atlixco, Mexico in 2000 
and 2001.  Also in 2001, USAS sent former student antisweatshop activist Evelyn 
Zepeda to Atlixco to facilitate solidarity actions with Kukdong/Mexmode 
workers, and then sent her on to Villa Altagracia, Dominican Republic, where she 
lived and worked as a liaison with BJ&B workers for almost two years. Student 
delegations to BJ&B workers in Villa Altagracia began in 2003 (Ross 2004). 
USAS and later a related organization, Solidarity Ignite, organized several student 
delegations to meet with Alta Gracia workers (many of whom worked for BJ&B 
before it closed) beginning soon after that factory opened in 2010  (Creager 2014; 
Potter 2012). 
 Thus, since the late 1990s student antisweatshop activists have been 
numerous, widespread, well-organized, and connected to their movement’s 
Global South partners and intended beneficiaries. However, although success 
requires activity, activity does not guarantee success. So, how effective has the 
U.S. antisweatshop movement’s student sector been in achieving its goal of 
promoting labor rights?  
 A detailed answer is far beyond the scope of this article, but the BJ&B 
unionization struggle illustrates some of the student sector’s effectiveness. Here 
we focus on U.S. student contributions to this effort, but we emphasize that 
without the BJ&B union activists’ tenacity, no amount of outside support would 
have made any impact.  
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BJ&B workers tried to form a union after UNITE documented the 
factory’s violations in 1998, without success; at one point BJ&B fired 20 union 
activists. In 2001 USAS’ on-site representative Evelyn Zepeda collaborated with 
BJ&B unionists to file a complaint to the WRC monitoring organization. Over the 
next year and a half the WRC demonstrated its effectiveness by leading and 
coordinating U.S. efforts to support BJ&B workers’ right to organize. In the 
process the WRC partnered with its competitor the FLA, and it persuaded BJ&B 
clients Nike, Reebok, and adidas to complain to the company.1 BJ&B resisted the 
union at each step, firing or threatening to fire union members and contesting the 
Dominican labor department’s certifications of the union’s status. Along the way 
student activists held actions in the U.S. and pressured BJ&B’s client brands, but 
the greatest direct leverage on BJ&B appears to have been the effort led by the 
WRC – the organization that student activists fought to initiate in 2000. WRC 
Executive Director Scott Nova identified codes of conduct, another hard-fought 
student accomplishment, as another key to ultimate success against BJ&B 
(Garwood 2011; Ross 2004).  
The new union, Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa BJ&B S.A., 
negotiated and implemented a contract with the company that took effect in mid-
2003, boosting wages 10 percent as well as ending involuntary overtime hours 
and providing “educational scholarships, paid holidays, and the establishment of a 
workers’ committee to deal with health and safety concerns at the factory” 
(Garwood 2011:180). Dominican FEDOTRAZONAS labor federation head 
Ygnacio Hernández, who was closely engaged in this struggle, credited USAS 
activists with playing a crucial role: “We were determined to win, but without 
them it would have taken us five more years. And it would have been more 
traumatic without them because all we would have was the pressure to strike” 
(quoted in Gonzalez 2003). In a 2007 conversation with one of the authors – 
about a month after BJ&B announced it was closing, a result of production 
moving to other countries with lower wages – Hernández again emphasized U.S. 
student activists’ important roles in FEDOTRAZONAS’ organizing efforts (first 
author’s notes, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, March 29). 
 Other examples of U.S. student antisweatshop activists’ effectiveness 
include: 
• pressing Nike to release licensed collegiate product supplier factory locations 
in 1999, a major breakthrough in the movement’s ability to detect labor 
abuses. Other major marketers followed (Garwood 2011; Greenhouse 1999). 
• supporting successful unionization and collective bargaining struggles at 
multiple collegiate apparel and textile factories noted above: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The European antisweatshop organization Clean Clothes Campaign was also involved in this 
struggle. 
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Kukdong/Mexmode in Mexico (2000-2002); Hanes TOS Dominicana/Dos 
Rios in the Dominican Republic (2006-2008); and Russell Athletics’ Jerzees 
de Honduras/Jerzees Nuevo Dia in Honduras (2008-2009) (Anner 2011; Ross 
2004; United Students Against Sweatshops 2008). 
• helping promote the creation and growth of the unique Alta Gracia collegiate 
apparel factory in Villa Altagracia, Dominican Republic after the BJ&B 
factory closed there in 2007; Alta Gracia, which began production in 2010, 
pays workers a living wage over three times the typical Dominican wage for 
such work (Dreier 2011). 
• pressing 23 colleges to require licensees producing in Bangladesh to join the 
Bangladesh Accord for Building and Fire Safety in response to the 2013 Rana 
Plaza factory collapse, and pressing 17 collegiate apparel licensees to do so, as 
of August 2014 (United Students Against Sweatshops 2014). 
• supplying a source of new staff to non-student U.S. labor rights groups, e.g., 
the union UNITE HERE and the International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) 
(Garwood 2011). 
To our knowledge, no quantitative study has isolated the student 
antisweatshop sector’s impact at the level of an entire nation-state or industry. 
However, one analysis of the Indonesian textile, apparel, and footwear 
manufacturing sectors – the targets of much global antisweatshop activism during 
the 1990s, including U.S. student activism – finds that wage levels in these sectors 
did in fact appear to increase due to movement activity, without any net loss of 
sector employment (Harrison and Scorse 2010). 
 These positive examples do not mean that student antisweatshop efforts 
have overwhelmingly succeeded.  Abuse and union-busting still pervade the 
global apparel industry. The antisweatshop movement as a whole has achieved 
only moderate “private-sector regulation” against labor rights violations, lacking 
the force of effective state regulation. The movement’s efforts to support workers’ 
struggles to organize are also often hamstrung by the “global runaway shop,” the 
growing ability for firms to relocate production to lower-wage, union-hostile 
locations (Ross 2004), which caused the 2007 closure of BJ&B noted above. 
 But, within its hostile neoliberal environment, the student sector has 
significantly impacted Global South apparel production for U.S. markets. The 
student sector’s accomplishments are even more impressive when compared to 
some national non-student consumer sector antisweatshop organizations that 
recently ceased to be independently viable (Sweatfree Communities and 
USLEAP, both absorbed into the ILRF) or simply evaporated (Campaign for 
Labor Rights). While an organization’s existence or independence does not 
guarantee its effectiveness, its nonexistence guarantees ineffectiveness, and 
declining resources lessen its likely impact (Alliance for Global Justice 2014; 
Sweatfree Communities 2014; US Labor Education in the Americas Project 
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2013). It may even be that these organizations have declined or disappeared 
specifically because they lack some of the student sector’s advantages that 
provide a steadier flow of optimistic, highly engaged participants. 
 Overall, then, the student sector of the U.S. antisweatshop movement has 
been well mobilized since 1997, and it has had some success in meeting its social 
change goals. What conditions facilitated this activity, and how has that activity 
been converted into effectiveness? In the remainder of this article we identify 
student sector advantages that answer this question.2 To accomplish our purpose 
we blend elements of disparate literatures including research on college students 
and administrations; social movement scholarship on collective identity, 
networks, strategy (“repertoires of contention”), and opportunity structures; and 
the political economy of global production networks (GPNs). Our analysis 
focuses on the most common student antisweatshop activity: at four-year and 
graduate degree-granting not-for-profit U.S. colleges, among young full-time 
students at those schools, targeting the apparel that makes up a large fraction of 
collegiate-licensed products. This analysis is important because identifying the 
student sector’s strengths may better enable its activists and allies to effectively 
play to those strengths; because our answers help illuminate social movements’ 
roles in GPNs; and because this analysis provides a foundation for further 
empirical research on these issues. 
 We next examine college student mobilization advantages related to 
campus collective identity and to the ease of interaction among students within 
campus networks. Then, we introduce GPNs as economic geographers have 
elaborated this concept, augmented with sociological understandings of power 
relations, and we apply this analytical tool to collegiate and other apparel. Finally, 
we delineate students’ strategic advantages rooted in administrators and students’ 
mutual dependence, in students’ relative ease of access to administrators, and in 
administrators’ pivotal position in global collegiate apparel production networks. 
 
MOBILIZATION ADVANTAGES 
College students have commonly played key roles in social movements, such as 
the U.S. civil rights and China’s 1989 Tienanmen Square protests (Morris 1981; 
Zhao 1998). As individuals, traditional-aged college students have high 
movement participation potential partly due to “biographical availability” 
(minimally competing life demands), particularly among more privileged students 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This article’s concern is the question of how the student sector came to be as persistently active 
and effective as it has, not whether it is more active and effective compared to the pre-existing 
non-student consumer sector of the U.S. antisweatshop movement. We suspect the “whether” 
question’s answer may be “yes,” but this article’s scope does not permit that comparison between 
sectors. The non-student consumer sector might have been at least equally active and effective in 
different ways and for different reasons than those we analyze for students. 
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(McAdam 1988). Academia’s formal cultural content, which ideally prepares 
students to critically examine their society and themselves, may also promote 
activism (Boren 2001; Polletta 1999). Some colleges have decades-old student 
activist subcultures that facilitate new movement activity (Crossley 2008; Van 
Dyke 1998). In this section we examine two intertwined campus features that 
promote student antisweatshop mobilization: campus cultures that nurture 
collective identity, and dense campus interaction structures. 
 
Collective Identity 
To exist and be effective, a movement requires participants who share a collective 
sense of identity: a shared sense of belonging to a larger community, promoted by 
symbolic rituals, places, and objects (Durkheim [1915] 1965; Hawdon and Ryan 
2011). Unsurprisingly, in many movements “recruitment has taken place 
primarily through preexisting solidarities” (Polletta and Jasper 2001:290); any 
movement possessing this advantage has a head start developing collective 
identity. 
 Taylor and Whittier emphasize that boundaries, “the social, psychological, 
and physical structures that establish differences between a challenging group and 
dominant groups” (1992:111), shape existing movements’ collective identities. 
Such boundaries apply equally to preexisting solidarities that supply members to 
movements, such as a given student body that feeds activists and supporters into a 
campus antisweatshop group. To exist, any group must create and recreate 
boundaries to divide “us” from “them” (Hunt and Benford 2007); to do so, groups 
use symbolic places, objects, events, and actions3, and they pass these cultural 
elements on to new members. Such boundaries impel students to identify with 
their college and each other (cf. Garwood 2011:67-72). 
 Many objects, events, and actions mark student body boundaries. Owning 
college-identified symbolic objects – mugs, class rings, or collegiate apparel – 
indicates school affiliation. Classes, meals, and other routine ritual interactions 
with faculty, staff, and other students give students a sense of belonging to the 
college and each other, as do formally organized ritual events (Bronner 2012; 
Nielsen 2011). 
 Boundaries that mark a student body’s collective identity are often 
geographic: on-campus places, delineated by symbolic objects located within 
them, as well as events and actions related to those places and objects. In other 
words, a student body tends to share a “sense of place,” often so strong that 
students refer to the school as “home” (Nielsen 2011). It is partly associated with 
a school’s architecture and landscapes, evident in these comments: “When I first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 By “event” we mean something that, from a given individual’s point of view, others have 
performed. By “action” we mean a behavior that a given individual commits. 
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walked on campus, I fell in love with it. Take a tour! It's wonderful! Enjoy the 
grass knolls and tal[l] brick buildings before you decide Towson University is 
your home” (Cappex 2009). Students figuratively own the landscape, exemplified 
by one school’s official statement that its continually repainted Spirit Rock 
“represents the spirit of UMW – whether advertising an event, showing spirit, or 
celebrating a recent victory.... The Spirit Rock belongs to students” (University of 
Mary Washington 2013:8). Whereas entities controlling a space as a “political 
place” often control its “cultural place” content as well, students exercise 
significant (albeit hardly hegemonic) ownership over campus symbols despite the 
administration’s legal authority over that space (Banerjee 2012). 
 Near-campus sites, such as bars, restaurants, coffee shops, and clusters 
thereof, also play important symbolic parts in school collective identities (e.g., 
High Street adjacent to The Ohio State University) (Wilson 2005). Off-campus 
student-dominated residential areas play similar roles. 
 Many events and actions important to campus collective identity occur at 
stadiums and arenas. The largest and most frequent face-to-face student 
gatherings may well be football or basketball games, where the team, marching 
bands, mascots, and revered coaches symbolically represent the college. These 
games reinforce collective identity partly by distinguishing “us” from “them.”  
Game chants often include first person plural pronouns, as in “We are ... Penn 
State!” or Virginia Tech’s “Let’s go ... Hokies!”; ritually participating with others 
at these visible and audible symbolic events – e.g., wearing the right colors, 
chanting the right chants at the right time – locate a person within a particular 
student body’s boundaries (Bronner 2012). 
 Particularly pertinent to our purpose is students’ wearing school logo 
apparel as a symbolic act that expresses group boundaries. Students at some 
schools wear this apparel several days a week. It is virtually required at athletic 
events, where its absence signals group members that the person is not one of 
them (Hunt and Benford 2007). That such apparel symbolizes a boundary for 
students – embedded in a system of other symbolic places, objects, actions, and 
events – provides an emotion-laden opportunity for a student antisweatshop group 
to frame apparel production labor abuses as an outrage that fellow students must 
help change (Katz forthcoming). In short, at any given College X (more at some 
colleges than others), intertwined boundary markers help define the student body 
as a consciously collective group. Students call themselves Eagles or Aggies. 
They refer to themselves as “we” and “us” at games and in routine informal 
conversations.  
 How, then, does the collective identity of College X students compare to 
the collective identity of Major Retail Chain Q or Apparel Brand R customers? 
The question matters because it is a question of the student antisweatshop sector’s 
mobilization capacity vis-à-vis that of the movement’s general (non-collegiate) 
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consumer sector. In the U.S. individuals commonly identify with particular 
companies’ apparel and with shopping at particular retail chain stores (Copeland 
and Labuski 2013; Lichtenstein 2009). That is, customers often identify with a 
company’s brand, a concept so pivotal that well-known companies like Nike and 
Russell Athletics are often referred to simply as “apparel brands”; U.S. college 
administrators also tend to think of their schools as having brands. A brand is a 
group symbol.  Brand identification promotes shared identity among that brand’s 
devotees, be they Eagles, Aggies, or Macy’s or Walmart shoppers. 
 We contend that students and alumni from a given college typically share 
a much stronger collective identity than particular chain retailers’ and apparel 
brands’ customers share among themselves. Retailers and brands simply lack the 
range and intensity of collective identity-promoting factors we described for 
colleges. For example, an Ohio State alumnus traveling abroad might 
enthusiastically initiate a conversation by introducing himself as a Buckeye to 
another traveler wearing an Ohio State t-shirt (as one of the authors has 
experienced while wearing such a t-shirt abroad), but a U.S. Walmart shopper 
abroad will less likely encounter another North American wearing apparel 
obviously labeled “Walmart” and will less likely enthusiastically introduce herself 
with the words “I’m a Walmart shopper!” if she did. A given school’s students 
experience symbolic places, events, actions, and objects together more intensely 
than retailers’ and brands’ customers – to the extent those consumers even 
interact. 
 Our point is not that Retailer Q/Brand R customers lack strong collective 
identities in the middle ground between nation or culture, on the one hand, and 
friends and families on the other. They may readily say “we” to refer to 
themselves and others from their cities or professions, for example. Our point is 
that they lack strong collective identities with these corporations’ other customers, 
hobbling a mechanism that might otherwise mobilize efforts to change these 
companies’ behaviors. College X students lack this disadvantage. 
 
Ease of Interaction: Proximity and Networks 
Just as movements routinely emerge from preexisting collective identities, 
movements routinely emerge from preexisting social structures and the 
relationships within them. Dense friendship, family, organizational, and other 
networks facilitate movement emergence, and a movement organization’s 
embeddedness in such networks goes far to account for the support it can 
mobilize (Crossley 2008; Diani 2007; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Morris 
1981; Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson 1980). For example, an individual’s 
preexisting network ties to a given movement – or their absence – strongly 
influence whether that person will participate in the movement (McAdam 1988). 
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 College campuses teem with intersecting networks, linking individual to 
individual, organization to organization, and informal group to informal group. 
The same face-to-face interaction that facilitates campus collective identity 
catalyzes these networks. It occurs at the on-campus and near-campus places 
described above. Students constantly encounter each other in academic activities, 
campus organizations and events, dining and drinking places, informal gatherings, 
and part-time jobs. They often live with fellow students in dormitories and 
apartments. These campus phenomena create and sustain a lively set of social 
networks. Thus, college campuses tend to be “free spaces” structurally conducive 
to movement activity (Crossley 2008; Polletta 1999). Once a campus movement 
group forms, members’ pre-existing ties and ongoing frequent face-to-face 
encounters with other students become channels to recruit campus individuals’ 
and organizations’ support. 
 To compare these College X students to customers of Retail Chain Q or 
Apparel Brand R, we offer the concept of spatial commensurability: the degree to 
which movement actors or whole movements can effectively engage their targets, 
directly or indirectly, unimpeded by physical distance. Spatial commensurability 
is not simply proximity to a particular target, but an overall strategic ability to 
reach targets so as to achieve movement goals. A College X student campaign is 
born embedded in dense local potentially-supportive networks that are spatially 
(or geographically) commensurate with a local but pivotal actor in the pertinent 
global production networks (GPNs): College X’s administration4, as we explain 
below. But potential activist customers of Retail Chain Q or Brand R typically 
face the company itself as the pivotal GPN actor to influence. This corporation 
depends on nationally5 dispersed brand promotion, stores, and other marketing 
operations. A non-collegiate consumer-sector campaign might achieve the spatial 
commensurability needed to confront this national target by developing – or more 
likely borrowing or organically emerging from – vigorous national networks.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 By “administration” we largely mean top positions in central administration that are ultimately 
responsible for licensed product policies. The particular administrative unit responsible for 
licensing varies among colleges (Rooksby 2014) – such as public relations offices and athletic 
departments – though a short review of news reports would show that student antisweatshop 
groups commonly engage presidents directly. In some cases a licensed product agreement and 
intercollegiate athletic equipment agreement may be combined, as in Ohio State’s current 
agreement with Nike (Byler 2013); such a link between licensed products and the broader interests 
of an athletic program and powerful coaches would doubtless influence an antisweatshop 
campaign’s dynamics on any given campus (e.g., to gain leverage in negotiating a favorable major 
agreement like this one, an administration might resist contemporaneous student antisweatshop 
activists’ demands such as joining the WRC). For lack of space in this article-length treatment, we 
do not examine such internal administration forces further. 
5 In this article we commonly refer to retailers’ and apparel brands’ operations as “national” for 
brevity. In reality, some major retail chains operate only regionally, while some other retail chains 
and especially apparel brands operate and market transnationally. 
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 Non-student antisweatshop activists have done this before. The 2000-2001 
Nicaragua labor rights campaign coordinated protests in 99 U.S. cities as part of a 
shaming strategy against Kohl’s and Target stores, relying significantly on 
preexisting national Central America peace movement activist networks (and 
aided by USAS) (Ricker and Wimberley 2003). This national antisweatshop 
network soon faded; it is hard for part-time volunteer activists to maintain 
networks and the collective identity that glues them together across a continent, 
though new communication technologies help. Other nationally robust networks 
might function similarly, one obvious candidate being labor unions. In other cases 
the movement’s general consumer sector has successfully organized locally to 
influence major local decision-makers in GPNs, similar to campus antisweatshop 
campaigns; Sweatfree Communities, noted earlier as having retrenched, pressured 
local governments (significant economic actors at many GPNs’ consuming ends) 
to adopt and enforce labor codes of conduct similar to collegiate codes 
(Esbenshade 2008).6 But the movement’s student sector campus milieu generates 
most of its spatially commensurate network infrastructure without activists’ 
exertions. A campus antisweatshop group is born with these advantages that non-
collegiate consumer-sector efforts commonly must try to build. 
 
STRUCTURAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS:  
POWER RELATIONS IN GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
Movements’ grievances about injustices are grievances against particular power 
configurations, and effective movement struggles to stop injustices require the 
movement’s injecting itself into those power relations to change them. For the 
antisweatshop movement, troublesome power relations exist within production 
and distribution processes. Sociologists and others have named and analyzed such 
processes as “commodity,” “value,” and “supply” chains (Bair 2009), sometimes 
focusing on labor-capital power relations more broadly (e.g., Dunaway 2014) but 
often focusing almost entirely on power relations among firms (e.g., Gereffi, 
Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005). We analyze these processes and their larger 
contexts through the related but more holistic global production network (GPN) 
perspective developed by economic geographers (Barrientos 2013; Coe, Dicken 
and Hess 2008; Dicken 2015).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 However, some efforts to solve the spatial commensurability puzzle depend not on multitudinous 
grassroots activists’ widespread direct physical proximity to targets, but on a few activists’ or paid 
staffmembers’ virtual presence in media. The National Labor Committee helped put “the 
sweatshop issue on the map” (Ross 2004:154) in 1996 using news media to nationally reveal 
Kathie Lee Gifford’s apparel brand’s reliance on child labor. Similarly, online activists have 
successfully attacked companies on a national scale with “culture jamming”: turning brands 
against their owners, often with parodies such as the “Justice: Do it Nike” takeoff of Nike’s “Just 
do it” slogan (Katz forthcoming; Klein 1999). 
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 A GPN is a set of social actors linked in a transnational process of 
producing, exchanging, sharing information about, struggling over, and ultimately 
consuming a product, all embedded in particular places and in a larger structural 
and cultural context. GPN actors include workers, firms, consumers, states, and 
civil society organizations, among others. Thus, GPNs contain both the problems 
constituting the antisweatshop movement’s grievances and – potentially – part of 
their solution. Expressed differently, GPNs and their contexts constitute much of 
the movement’s opportunity structure: economic, cultural, political, and other 
conditions constituting the movement’s opportunities and constraints (McAdam 
1996; Wimberley 2009).  
 To understand how the antisweatshop movement can inject itself into 
these GPNs, we must understand movement actors’ potential roles in the GPNs. 
For this we must identify a GPN’s preexisting actors and how they use resources 
to pursue goals within this network. We must understand what power advantages 
certain GPN actors have vis-à-vis other actors, what makes these actors pivotal, 
and what makes them vulnerable. 
 
Apparel GPNs  
Three types of lead firms – which are also brands widely recognized by 
consumers – disproportionately capture profits in the dominant apparel GPNs 
supplying U.S. consumers. The first two types operate no factories: branded 
marketers (e.g., Nike) that have well-advertised brands; and retailers (e.g., major 
retail chains as different as Wal-Mart discount stores and upscale Nordstrom, and 
specialty retailers such as Gap), who often sell their own private label (store) 
brands and, at least if they are more upscale, branded marketers’ apparel as well 
(Appelbaum and Lichtenstein 2006). These retailers and branded marketers rely 
heavily on unbranded “full-package production” contractors, often based in the 
Global South (e.g., Mexico’s Grupo Kaltex), who obtain the raw materials and 
organize the production process. The third lead firm type, branded manufacturers 
(e.g., Fruit of the Loom or HanesBrands), possess widely-recognized brand 
names; they operate their own factories, or closely coordinate “industrial 
subcontracting networks” of firms that themselves run factories, or both (Bair and 
Gereffi 2003). In all these cases, assembly routinely occurs in the Global South. 
 These three types of leading firms tend to exercise disproportionate power 
over their suppliers, but they are not equals. Spurred significantly by neoliberal 
practices, the “pull system” or buyer-driven production network – in which 
retailers tend to dictate prices, specifications, and schedules to manufacturers – 
now dominates the apparel industry (Appelbaum and Lichtenstein 2006; Gereffi 
1994). Monopolistic market shares make large retailers particularly powerful vis-
à-vis manufacturers. 
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 Figure 1 depicts a GPN for a large U.S. retail chain buying apparel from a 
U.S.-based branded manufacturer with assembly in the Global South. (Space 
limitations prohibit examining GPNs for branded marketers or for branded 
manufacturers that rely entirely on external subcontracting networks.) This 
simplified GPN includes only actors engaged in economic exchanges with each 
other (heavy arrows) and excludes inputs, e.g., fabric. Light arrows signify 
information flows such as contract negotiations and orders to perform work. 
Large Retail Chain Q is a major discounter (e.g., Walmart, Target) or department 
store (more likely a “downmarket” store such as Sears or Kohl’s, since upscale 
stores’ more prestigious brands tend to come from branded marketers). Branded 
Manufacturer R may use its own Assembly Workers to make all the apparel, or it 
may contract some or all assembly to Contractor(s) S. All this is embedded in a 
structural and cultural context including trade agreements, labor laws and their 
enforcement, labor pools, competing firms, interfirm relationships, consumer 
preferences and firms’ efforts to shape those preferences, political and economic 
ideologies, political structures and conflicts, and social movement activity, among 
other elements. 
 This network is a set of power relations. What gives which actors how 
much power over which other actors in this GPN? Although its account of power 
is limited, exchange theory helps answer this question by implying three other 
questions about exchange networks (Emerson 1981): (1) What resources does 
each actor control? (2) Which other actors value or seek these resources? (3) 
What alternative sources do the latter actors have for each of these resources? 
Figure 1 indicates the key resources that the GPN’s actors seek from and 
exchange with each other. Space precludes discussing all these power relations, 
but a key principle governing them is that having more alternatives vis-à-vis other 
actors gives one a power advantage that translates into economic advantages.7 
Notably,  Large  Retail  Chain  Q  has  more  flexibility  to  choose  alternatives to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This principle fundamentally explains why the unionized BJ&B factory in the Dominican 
Republic (described at length earlier) closed in 2007. Soon after the 2003 union contract took 
effect, BJ&B began laying off many workers when Nike and Reebok – despite these branded 
marketers’ previous apparent cooperation in calling on BJ&B to allow workers to organize – cut 
the prices they would pay contractors for caps. BJ&B shut down completely in 2007 after losing 
branded marketers’ orders to factories in lower-wage sites, an option more readily available to the 
brands due to increasingly freer trade policies (notably the 2005 demise of the Multifibre 
Arrangement (MFA), which had placed quotas on apparel imports (Dicken 2015)) (Garwood 
2011). Despite workers’ intense efforts and despite initially effective foreign solidarity with them, 
the BJ&B workers were ultimately devastated by global mobility of production – the fact that 
brands like Nike have many alternatives and there is little to prevent their using those alternatives. 
Power over workers’ pay and conditions ultimately lies much more with the world’s Nikes than 
with its BJ&Bs, but due to complex contracting arrangements in buyer-driven GPNs – 
arrangements that few consumers understand but that we seek to clarify in this article – the Nikes 
can usually shift blame for union-busting, low wages, and poor conditions to the BJ&Bs. 
15
Wimberley et al.: Systemic Advantages for Student Antisweatshop Activism
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2015
 
 
Figure 1. Power relations among actors in a US-retail-chain-driven global 
apparel production network (GPN) sourcing from a branded manufacturer with 
production in the Global South 
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Branded Manufacturer R than R has alternatives for Q (e.g., even though there is 
a limited number of Branded Manufacturers to choose among, Q could replace 
one large R with another, and the replacement R could even use some of the same 
contractor factories as its predecessor to fill increased production needs, but an R 
that loses a large retailer will have difficulty making up those sales); the larger 
Q’s retail market share, the stronger its advantages over any given R. Retailer Q 
has comparatively many alternative Customers – although, if the Customers were 
organized, they could withdraw their resources (capacity to spend) on which the 
entire GPN’s existence depends. Just as notably, Apparel Workers for R or S in 
the Global South have relatively few employment alternatives, whereas Branded 
Manufacturer R and Contractor S have many alternative employees due to 
frequently high unemployment and underemployment in the Global South, and 
due to many such firms’ capacity to move to other countries. 
 Consider this example for Figure 1’s generic GPN: a Fruit of the Loom 
(FOL) men’s short-sleeve, crew-neck cotton t-shirt with no imprint, made in El 
Salvador and sold in four-packs of assorted colors for $11.44 at a Walmart 
Supercenter retail store in 2013. Branded manufacturer FOL, a Berkshire 
Hathaway subsidiary, made about 33 percent of its 2013 sales to Walmart. For 
apparel it sells in North America, FOL “generally performs its own ... cutting, 
sewing and packaging,” performing assembly “in lower labor cost facilities in the 
Caribbean and Central America” (Berkshire Hathaway 2014). However, as we 
show below, FOL collegiate licensed apparel assembly in El Salvador relies partly 
on contractors, and it seems unlikely that FOL would organize its noncollegiate 
Salvadoran apparel assembly very differently. Thus, the t-shirts at Walmart 
apparently were assembled in one or more FOL-owned factories and/or one or 
more contractor factories in El Salvador. 
 In this t-shirt GPN, Walmart appears to have more alternatives than other 
actors, considering that if Walmart dropped FOL as a supplier it might well 
replace those t-shirts from other branded manufacturers or nonbranded full-
package contractors, either of which might increase production rapidly by 
subcontracting (including to FOL’s current contractors). FOL likely cannot 
replace the one-third of its sales going to Walmart, giving Walmart considerable 
leverage over FOL to keep prices low. This cost pressure passes through the GPN 
to FOL’s and contractors’ Salvadoran Assembly Workers. With 6 percent 
unemployment in 2012 (International Labour Organization 2014), El Salvador’s 
workers had more job alternatives than workers in countries with very high 
unemployment, but their country’s 34 percent poverty rate in 2012 severely 
limited alternatives for higher-paying jobs (World Bank 2014). 
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Collegiate Apparel GPNs  
Licensed collegiate branded apparel (hereafter “collegiate apparel”) is apparel that 
bears a college’s name or other trademarks. Branded marketers, branded 
manufacturers, and unbranded manufacturers pay college administrations 
royalties in return for legal permission (licenses) to supply it to retailers (Rooksby 
2014). Thus, administrations are gatekeepers in the collegiate apparel GPNs that 
student antisweatshop groups target for change. 
 Figure 2 depicts a collegiate apparel GPN with a branded manufacturer as 
the licensee. Power relations among Branded Manufacturer Y, Contractor Z (if 
present), and Assembly Workers essentially match those in noncollegiate apparel 
GPNs. Here we focus on power dynamics between College X’s Administration 
and Branded Manufacturer Y, ignoring retailers’ roles to simplify discussion. 
College X Administration’s key resource is monopoly control over access to the 
College X apparel market. If College X will not grant Branded Manufacturer Y a 
license, Y may not easily find a substitute, especially if enrollment size, athletic 
program prominence, or other factors make X’s apparel market large. Branded 
Manufacturer Y’s resources are its abilities to organize production, distribute 
products, and attract consumers with a more or less recognized brand. Though X’s 
Administration has multiple prospective branded manufacturer licensees, Y’s 
absence might create a royalty gap for which X cannot easily substitute. College 
X’s Administration also has a relationship with College X Students, examined 
later. These students purchase much of College X’s apparel, making its 
administration and Branded Manufacturer Y dependent on them. 
 Consider this example: in 2013 online retailer Amazon offered a $15 
scarlet Ohio State men’s cotton short-sleeve crew-neck t-shirt with mascot Brutus 
Buckeye printed on front, listed as made in El Salvador, from the Russell Brands 
division of branded manufacturer Fruit of the Loom (Amazon.com 2013; 
Berkshire Hathaway 2014). Worker Rights Consortium factory database entries 
for July 2012 through March 2013 indicate that one or more of ten factories made 
this line of t-shirts.8 FOL appeared to operate four of the them, evidenced by 
contact email addresses with the company’s “fruit.com” internet domain name: 
Joyas, Lamatepec, and Montecristo in Zona Franca American Industrial Park, 
Ciudad Arce; and Santa Ana Apparel Limitada in Export Salva Free Zone, Colón 
(Worker Rights Consortium 2012-2013). 
 The other six factories appear to be independent contractors. Apple Tree in 
San Marcos (Zona Franca San Marcos), owned by the Korean AT Group, 
reportedly has other factories in Nicaragua and Bangladesh (Institute for Global 
Labour  and  Human Rights  2011).  Korean-owned  Lido  Industrias  in  San Juan  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Other universities reported these factories – dozens of schools, in some factories’ cases. But Ohio 
State, though a WRC member, does not report this information. Thus, we cannot be certain we 
have identified all OSU-Russell t-shirt factories. 
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Figure 2. Power relations among actors in a collegiate licensed apparel GPN 
sourcing from a branded manufacturer with production in the Global South
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Opico (Zona Franca Lido Industrias), apparently a single-factory firm, shut down 
without paying workers in 2007 but reopened by early 2009 (Worker Rights 
Consortium 2008). Manufacturas del Río in El Rosario (Zona Franca El 
Pedregal), which closed without warning at the end of 2013 after a union 
organized the plant, was part of a Nicaraguan-based firm that is majority-owned 
by Mexico’s Grupo Kaltex full-package contractor (Centro de Estudios y Apoyo 
Laboral 2014). These three factories illustrate the diversity of company sizes, 
national origins, and organizational forms among apparel contractors. We could 
not locate such details about the other three contracting factories: Hermano Textil 
II, San Marcos; Confecciones Maya, Metapán; and Memosa Manufacturing, 
Apopa. FOL’s ability to choose among alternative contractors in El Salvador and 
elsewhere should help it boost profits by providing leverage to minimize 
contractors’ prices. 
 The $15 Russell Athletics Ohio State t-shirt embodies the power 
relationship between College X’s Administration and Branded Manufacturer Y. 
This large university with prominent athletic programs recently claimed to have 
the “most lucrative” U.S. college licensing program, with annual retail sales 
estimated at about $300 million (Rouan 2012). FOL would find it difficult to 
make up for a lost Ohio State license accounting for just a few percentage points 
of this $300 million, which tends to give the Ohio State administration strong 
leverage to extract high royalty rates and other resources from FOL.9 
Simultaneously, the Ohio State administration depends on FOL and other 
licensees to generate royalty revenues, and it only has just so many alternatives to 
FOL. But this power relation reveals FOL’s vulnerability to Ohio State’s 
gatekeeping decisions; the administration’s power has limits. (Note that states 
affect these power relations (Dicken 2015), but states’ changed roles under 
neoliberal globalization combined with their fundamentally secondary roles in 
labor-capital conflicts have helped exclude them as primary actors and movement 
targets in this immediate context.) 
 Apparel GPNs’ dominant actors sustain themselves from marketing and 
other operations dispersed over national (or larger) geographic domains, posing a 
huge field for U.S. antisweatshop actors to cover. But the fact that one key actor 
in collegiate apparel GPNs – the administration – operates largely within a local 
domain creates a spatially commensurate opportunity for a locally effective 
antisweatshop group. We next examine how such movement actors can tap into 
and use Ohio State’s and other administrations’ vulnerabilities, which in turn 
gives them an opportunity to inject themselves into these GPN power relations 
and change them. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 However, Ohio State’s administration clearly lacks chain retailer Walmart’s leverage, its one-
third share of FOL sales being undoubtedly vastly greater than Ohio State’s share. 
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STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES 
Movement actors choose targets for various reasons (Bartley and Child 2014), but 
one of the most important criteria is access. Piven and Cloward observed that 
college students protesting the Vietnam War by “attacking blameless 
administrators and faculties” were simply protesting where they could, “where 
they played a role on which an institution depended, so that their defiance 
mattered.... People cannot defy institutions to which they have no access, and to 
which they make no contribution” (1979:22-23). U.S. student antisweatshop 
activists today have perhaps even less access to Congress and the U.S. president 
than student anti-war protestors had in 1970. But their effective capacity to defy 
their own administrations reflects a strategic opportunity for present-day student 
antisweatshop activists (Kelly and Lefkowitz 2003), for whom administrations are 
apt targets (see Garwood 2011): a given school’s administration occupies a 
gatekeeping position in collegiate product GPNs, deciding whether any given 
particular marketer or manufacturer will receive a license to use their logos. The 
administration is student agency’s primary entry point into collegiate apparel 
GPNs, a pivot to leverage production networks that shape production workers’ 
rights and conditions. This particular strategic advantage, which the U.S. 
antisweatshop movement’s general consumer sector lacks, is a structural 
opportunity that complements student antisweatshop activists’ mobilization 
advantages examined earlier. Student activists’ ability to act upon this advantage 
derives from their effective claims on and proximity to the administration.  
 Students obviously need certain things from administrations, but the 
dependence is mutual (Figure 2). Students can claim an administration’s attention 
because administrations need cooperation and certain vital resources from 
students (cf. Nielsen 2011); students are in an exchange network with the 
administration. In Figure 2 this potential was unrealized, with students 
unorganized and relatively passive. In Figure 3 a student antisweatshop group 
identifying and coordinating with apparel factory workers has emerged to turn 
this potential power into leverage over collegiate apparel GPN gatekeepers. 
Noncollegiate customers of large apparel retailers and brands typically lack this 
advantage unless they can organize many activists nationally. Compared to those 
firms’ dependence on almost any set of non-collegiate consumers ever organized 
by the U.S. antisweatshop movement, a given school’s administrators have much 
greater dependence on even a small campus antisweatshop group. Because 
student antisweatshop groups coordinate nationally through USAS, this dynamic 
repeats at scores of colleges, translating to significant national limits on collegiate 
apparel licensees’ alternatives. 
 A college administration needs enrollments that justify the school’s 
existence to  legislators or donors,  and it needs students’ tuition and fees.  But for  
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Figure 3. Power and other relations among actors in a collegiate licensed 
apparel GPN sourcing from a branded manufacturer with production in the 
Global South, with an organized student group  
22
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol10/iss1/3
Figure 3, continued. 
 
 
 
 
what else does an administration depend on its students? Part of the answer is that 
current students are future alumni. An administration depends on loyal alumni’s 
donations. Supportive alumni also foster state officials’ (for public colleges) and 
governing boards’ favorable perceptions, channeling outside resources to the 
administration. An important part of an administration’s cultivating alumni 
support is creating a positive image with them while they are still students. 
Outright dismissal of student overtures creates a negative image that may spread 
beyond antisweatshop activists to their friends, to other sympathizers among the 
student body, and even to alumni. 
 Administrations consciously depend on students’ and alumni’s positive 
words to friends, family members, and others to help recruit applicants. For 
example, a University of Mary Washington email urged alumni to “Support Mary 
Washington by referring a future [Mary Washington] Eagle.... Our alumni serve 
as UMW’s best recruiters” (University of Mary Washington Office of Alumni 
Relations 2013). School identities that facilitate antisweatshop mobilization, 
discussed above, can also inspire student and alumni favor toward 
administrations. 
 More broadly, what students and alumni tell others about the college 
assists or impedes administration efforts to promote a particular school “brand” to 
state officials, prospective students, and others – a goal reflecting the ideology 
that colleges should be run like businesses, part of the same neoliberal milieu that 
generated current apparel GPNs (McAlexander and Koenig 2010). Brands relate 
directly to collegiate-licensed apparel: administrations depend on students, 
alumni, and their families to buy this branded apparel. An administration thus has 
a motive to avoid apparel brand damage among this audience, as exemplified by a 
Haverford College official who noted “schools don't want the backlash that 
Kathie Lee Gifford faced years ago when labor activists revealed that some 
garments from her clothing line came from a Honduran sweatshop” (Cohen and 
Levinson 2000). A campus antisweatshop group’s ability to sully a school’s brand 
by publicizing labor rights abuses is a strategic advantage. 
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 Aside from specific resources administrators obtain from students such as 
enrollments, tuition, future donations and other support, help in recruiting new 
students, and positive impacts on the brand, administrators rely on students for 
cooperation in general – a major student “contribution,” Piven and Cloward might 
say. Active nonviolence strategists have long understood this principle (e.g., 
Gandhi [1925-1929] 1993). As in any relationship between people in authority 
and others who routinely accept their authority, students have the power to 
withdraw their cooperation, although students infrequently think to do so as a 
collective strategy. Administrations depend on students not to do so, relying on 
them to adhere to procedures and norms central to everyday campus operations; to 
not generate negative publicity; and to not occupy campus offices in protest. 
Merely the perceived threat of noncooperation may lead administrators to accede 
to student demands. If students openly clash with administrators, the latter may 
appear ineffective to the governing boards that hire, fire, evaluate, and promote 
them. In public colleges such conflicts may impair administrators’ relationships 
with state officials. 
 A “rational” and informed administration seems likely to cultivate 
friendly, cooperative, and supportive student and alumni relationships, especially 
considering that administrations have limited substitutes for such supporters. But 
an administration might reject student antisweatshop activists’ demands for 
various reasons, including disinclination to expend time and effort to address 
student concerns (among competing problems and multiple constituencies that 
seem more compelling than the student activists), or fear that labor rights 
measures may limit royalties (although administrations could benefit from 
cultivating “buycotts” favoring apparel produced under just conditions (Katz 
2011)), or resentment toward student intrusion in what the administration 
considers its prerogatives. These factors may emerge from individual 
administrators’ personal inclinations, from organizational inertia, and/or from 
firmly established local administrative norms. Like students, administrations have 
cultures and inhabit social structures. For that matter, key administrators may 
disagree. Of course, just as an administration depends on its students, students 
depend on the administration. Students have potential power over the 
administration, but the administration simultaneously has power over students and 
has practice exercising it, making activism potentially costly.  
 Administrators’ dependence on students creates one particularly important 
corollary advantage for student activists: college students have relatively easy – 
often face-to-face – access to administrators compared to consumers’ access to 
major retailers’ and brands’ executives. This varies among colleges, but 
administrators seem likely to pay any student’s complaint some attention, and 
student government (sometimes engaged as a partner by student antisweatshop 
groups) commonly has routine communications with upper administrators. 
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Furthermore, security barriers that separate major retail and brand executives 
from their customers typically do not exist to nearly the same degree between 
college administrators and students. For example, in 2014 members of 
USAS@VT (USAS Local 124) at the first author’s university, accompanied by 
two Bangladeshi factory worker representatives, their translator, and a national 
USAS staffperson – at least 16 people – entered the administration building, 
passed by visiting prospective students and their parents, and walked into the 
president’s outer office unhindered, all while chanting for the university to end a 
contract with VF Corporation for not joining the Bangladesh Accord for Building 
and Fire Safety (direct observations and photographs by first author, April 15, 
2014). 
 Students also have easier access to administrators due to a factor identified 
earlier as promoting student-to-student interaction that facilitates mobilization: 
physical proximity. Few Walmart shoppers live close to corporate headquarters in 
Bentonville, Arkansas, but students may routinely walk past campus 
administration buildings and even encounter upper-level administrators. To draw 
another example from USAS@VT, in 2014 its members spoke directly with the 
university president when they unexpectedly met him warily descending the 
administration building steps as they were about to enter the building (direct 
observations by first author, March 28, 2014). 
 Aside from leverage over administrations, the student sector has some 
leverage over branded collegiate product manufacturers and marketers simply 
because the student sector represents these firms’ customers – similar to the U.S. 
antisweatshop movement general consumer sector’s more widely dispersed 
relationships with such firms. But the student sector’s best opportunity to leverage 
GPN power relations remains with college administrations. 
 When a few students at a given college become aware of and identify with 
people in the Global South who make their school’s apparel, when they organize 
on campus, and when they coordinate with subsets of apparel workers who have 
organized into unions and similar groups (Figure 3), they transform this 
opportunity with their administration into strategic action. At this point they insert 
themselves into the collegiate apparel GPN’s power relations, to collaborate with 
production workers to help change those relationships. This is the final link in the 
chain that makes student antisweatshop efforts spatially commensurate with the 
GPNs they seek to change. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. antisweatshop movement’s student sector’s goals include promoting 
labor rights and better working conditions among collegiate apparel workers in 
the Global South, taking direction from those workers and from the union 
organizers and human rights activists who are their local allies. We have spelled 
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out new arguments to illuminate conditions facilitating the student sector’s 
mobilization around – and its moderate success with – these goals, compared to 
the movement’s non-student consumer sector. Two distinctive campus conditions 
help the student sector recruit and activate supporters: pre-existing collective 
identity and frequent interaction among students. Student activists often can 
convert this potential into achieved goals because students can leverage the 
college administrations that decide whether a firm may market their licensed 
collegiate apparel. This structural and cultural context renders the movement’s 
student sector spatially commensurate with economic actors it must pressure and 
global production networks it must change to achieve its goals. 
 Our analysis contributes an exemplar to sociologists’ and other scholars’ 
efforts to understand how social movement agency can strategically engage 
complex and spatially large structures of global political economy. Networks and 
power relations constitute our two key conceptual tools for linking these various 
actors and processes that range from the microlevel (mobilization among students 
on a single campus) to the mesolevel (U.S. student group ties across campuses 
and to organized Global South apparel workers; a given school’s administration 
and its relations with students and with licensees) to the macrolevel (entire global 
production networks attached to networks of campus relationships). The student 
antisweatshop sector’s home lies within campus networks among students and 
with administrators. These campus networks overlap with global collegiate 
apparel production networks (GPNs) in that administrations occupy pivotal 
positions in both networks. Power relations pervade both networks; because these 
seemingly disparate networks overlap, they constitute a single larger network, 
providing a single system of power relations and movement dynamics for student 
activists to take strategic advantage of – and for scholars to make sense of.  
 We also link antisweatshop activism with spatial principles and 
perspectives. Economic geographers’ GPN approach, compared to sociologists’ 
current global commodity chain approaches that focus more exclusively on 
economic actors, facilitates our analysis with its explicit emphases on networks 
and movement actors (Coe, Dicken and Hess 2008). Our analysis in turn offers 
GPN scholars sociological understandings of (1) the power relations emphasized 
in GPN literature (e.g., applying exchange theory) and (2) social movement 
dynamics (e.g., how certain movement actors can more readily mobilize to 
leverage economic actors in apparel GPNs). Further, we offer social movement 
scholarship the concept of spatial commensurability as a heuristic device to 
analyze movement actors’ and targets’ overlapping spatial distributions and the 
implications of such overlap (or its absence) for movements’ engagement with 
those targets – particularly pertinent for movements having transnational 
grievances. 
26
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol10/iss1/3
 Finally, we hope to assist and encourage current and prospective student 
antisweatshop activists and their allies by identifying their potential strengths. 
Understanding the logics of and synergies among the mobilizing processes, 
strategic locations, and global production contexts that we have examined can 
help activists effectively plan and use their systemic advantages. Our analysis 
may also help alert non-student labor rights activists to the student sector’s 
advantages and the possible need to emulate or substitute for them.  We invite 
activists’ feedback. 
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